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Abstract 
Human capital has often been discussed in transaction cost economics, 
particularly in connection with understanding the employment relation. This 
chapter reviews Williamson’s thinking on the issue, explains how it differs from 
Coase and Simon’s, and briefly discusses the relevant empirical literature. The 
chapter also covers property rights theory, and discusses various critiques of the 
treatment of human capital in transaction cost economics.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
Human capital may be defined as the stock of valued skills, knowledge, insights, etc. controlled 
by an individual, in other words, the attributes of this individual that are valuable in an 
economic context. This stock may yield services such as labor services, management services or 
entrepreneurship. As slavery is almost universally prohibited, the issue is not one of allocation 
of ownership to human capital, but of whether these services are supplied through market 
transactions, transactions in an employment relation, in club-like organization (Buchanan, 1965) 
or within households (Becker, 1964, 1991). A key issue in the body of micro-economic thought 
commonly referred as “organizational economics” or the “theory of the firm” concerns the 
efficient organization of such transactions, specifically across contracts and governance 
structures. By supplying instruments of coordination and providing incentives, contracts and 
governance coordinate human capital services, but also provide incentives for investments in 
human capital. Under a norm of efficiency (value maximization) which specific contracts or 
governance structures that human capital is matched with depends on the characteristics of the 
latter.  
While this overall perspective cuts across transaction costs economics, property 
rights/incomplete contracts theory, and agency theory, the specific terminology (“transactions”, 
“governance structures” etc.) applied here is particular to transaction cost economics 
(henceforth, “TCE”). Arguably, this is warranted as TCE has provided the first and still most 
comprehensive treatment of the organizational ramifications of human capital in economics. The 
present chapter surveys TCE as it pertains to human capital, concentrating on the work of TCE’s 
most prominent flagbearer, Oliver Williamson, the precursors of his work (i.e., Coase [1937] 
and Simon [1951]) as well as the various operationalizations and extensions of his approach.  
Also briefly discussed is the property rights approach (Hart, 1995), which like TCE rests on the 
notion of incomplete contracting and the need to safeguard transactions under such conditions. 
 While human capital plays a key role in these approaches as an important component in 
the explanation of important aspects of economic organization, notably the boundaries of the 
firm, it is important to stress that neither TCE nor PPR hold very specific implications 
 2
concerning the management of human capital. As Loasby (1995) observes neither carry any 
particular implications regarding what to “tell Mrs. Jones what to do on Monday morning.” TCE 
or PPR are not HRM or general management approaches, and they were never designed as such. 
They are rather somewhat static approaches concerned with the efficient matching of 
transactions and governance structures/allocations of property rights at a point of time, they are 
not taken up with process analysis, managerial decision premises, and so on, and like most of 
economics, they make heavily simplified assumptions concerning the motivation and cognition 
of agents.1 Nevertheless, TCE in particular has been subject to heavy criticism from 
management scholars who have indicted the theory for it purportedly being “bad for practice.” 
Other critiques on the part of management scholars concern the neglect of differential firm-level 
capabilities, and the basis of such capabilities in human capital. Such critiques are briefly 
discussed at the end of this chapter.  
 
THE ROLE OF HUMAN CAPITAL IN TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS 
Transaction Cost Economics: Overall 
The foundations of contemporary transaction cost economics were laid by Ronald Coase 
(1937, 1960). The logical starting for a transaction cost approach to governance and 
organizational issues is Coase’s (1960) insight that if it weren’t for transaction costs, all gains to 
trade would be exhausted and this could take place under any organizational arrangement. This 
connects to Coase’s earlier paper (Coase, 1937), for the argument in that paper is that the 
assessment of the net benefits of organizational and governance alternatives must proceed in 
terms of a comparative analysis of the costs of transacting under the relevant alternatives (Barzel 
and Kochin, 1992).  
 In a string of influential contributions, Williamson (e.g., 1971, 1973, 1975, 1985, 1996) 
has built a theory that while built on Coasian foundations also incorporates ideas from 
psychology and contract law. The behavioral starting points in Williamson’s theorizing are 
bounded rationality and opportunism. Simon’s notion of bounded rationality implies the 
 
1 But for attempts to take TCE and PPR in a management direction, see Rubin (1987) and Milgrom and Roberts 
(1992). 
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presence of contractual incompleteness and, consequently, a need for adaptive, sequential 
decision-making. Opportunism is defined as “self-interest seeking with guile,” and its 
implication is that contracts will often need various types of safeguards, such as “hostages” 
(e.g., the posting of a bond with the other party). The unit of analysis in Williamson’s work is 
the multi-dimensional transaction. In addition to uncertainty (which is “frozen”), the dimensions 
of transactions that are primarily determinative of the costs of those transactions are frequency 
and asset specificity. In an early contribution, Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978: 297) linked 
asset specificity to the concept of appropriable quasi-rent:  
Assume an asset is owned by one individual and rented to another individual. 
The quasi-rent value of the asset is the excess of its value over its salvage value, 
that is, its value in its next best use to another renter. The potentially appropriable 
specialized portion of the quasi rent is that portion, if any, in excess of its value 
to the second highest-valuing user.  
Following Klein, Crawford and Alchian, asset specificity has increasingly become the 
central character in Williamson’s analysis. Williamson (1996) now identifies six different 
reasons why assets may be costly to redeploy, namely because of attachment to a brand name, a 
need to take quick actions (“temporal specificity”), market size (“dedicated assets”), 
localization, physical characteristics, and specialized knowledge ( that is, human capital 
specificity.  
Specific assets open the door to opportunism. If contracts are incomplete due to bounded 
rationality, they must be renegotiated as uncertainty unfolds, and if a party to the contract (say, a 
supplier firm) has incurred sunk costs in developing specific assets (including human capital), 
that other party can opportunistically appropriate an undue part of the investment’s pay-off 
(“quasi-rents”) by threatening to withdraw from the relationship. This situation leads to a 
Pareto-inferior outcome, for example, a no-trade outcome. Efficiency dictates the internalization 
within a firm of fransactions that involve highly specific assets. More generally, Williamson 
(1985: 68) argues that variety in contracts and governance structures “… is mainly explained by 
underlying differences in the attributes of transactions.” The general design principle of 
discriminating alignment dictates aligning transactions that differ in the dimensions of 
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uncertainty, frequency and asset specificity with governance structures which differ in the 
capacities to handle different transactions (cf. the earlier discussion of governance structures and 
governance mechanisms) in transaction cost discriminating way. Thus, specific constellations of 
(values for) the uncertainty, frequency and asset specificity variables map directly into specific 
governance structures. This is the main predictive content of Williamsonian TCE. 
So far, there is nothing particular about human capital; it is just a capital asset like any other 
which may be more or less specialized to specific uses and/or users. It may explain variation in 
the organization of transactions across markets, hybrids and hierarchies, exactly as, for example, 
physical assets may. However, it is important to bear in mind that Williamson not only 
emphasizes that transactions differ in the three mentioned dimensions; he is also adamant that 
alternative governance structures have differential capacities for governing different 
transactions. And it is here that (specific) human capital partakes of particular importance in 
Williamson’s thought, for it relates directly to the employment relation and the understanding of 
the costs and benefits of hierarchical governance. To see this it may be instructive to look at the 
precursors of Williamson’s analysis of the employment relation, namely Coase (1937) and 
Simon (1951).   
Coase and Simon on the Employment Relation  
 In his classic paper, Coase (1937) essentially defines the firm as the employment relation, 
In the presence of uncertainty, Coase argues, contingencies are costly to anticipate and describe 
in advance, and rather than negotiating on a spot market basis over each contingency as they 
arise, an employment contract is concluded. The latter is defined as “… one whereby the factor, 
for a certain remuneration (which may be fixed or fluctuating) agrees to obey the directions of 
an entrepreneur within certain limits. The essence of the contract is that it should only state the 
limits to the powers of the entrepreneur. Within these limits, he can therefore direct the other 
factors of production” (idem. 242).   
 Simon (1951) defines authority as obtaining when a “boss” is permitted by a “worker” to 
select actions, A0 ( A, where A is the set of the worker’s possible behaviors. More or less 
authority is then defined as making the set A0 larger or smaller. The boss then picks the action 
that he prefers and directs the worker to that action which ( for the latter to accept the 
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assignment ( must lie within his or her “zone of acceptance.” A worker’s zone of acceptance is 
defined in Simon as that set of actions where the worker’s expected costs of carrying out these 
actions do not exceed the agreed-upon on wage. An important feature of authority is that the 
authority of a superior is constrained by the acceptance of the subordinate of the authority. “A 
subordinate may be said to accept authority,” Simon (1951: 22) explains, “… whenever he 
permits his behavior to be guided by a decision reached by another, irrespective of his own 
judgment as to the merits of that decision.” In contrast, in a market contract, the parties 
negotiate ex ante about the actions that the agent can take in response to various contingencies 
so as to fulfill the contract. Thus, the principal’s flexibility under market contracting is limited 
compared to what it would be under authority. 
 Clearly, Simon’s explanation of authority and the employment relation is quite akin to 
Coase’s  (1937). To both of them authority is a decision right that an employer acquires, because he 
expects to obtain only ex post contracting the relevant information that will make it possible for 
him to pick his preferred actions within a specified subset of actions, which he will then direct the 
employee to carry out.  Knowledge and knowledge asymmetries is not an essential part of either 
story (as they are in, e.g., Demsetz, 1991). Thus, in Simon symmetric knowledge is consistent with 
the authority relation; it is sufficient for the existence of that relation that one contracting party for 
whatever reason stands to gain more than the other from picking the actions once contingencies 
materialize. The thrust of Coase’s discussion, however, indicates that the employer is clearly the 
informed party who picks well-defined actions from a set of discrete actions on the basis of 
knowledge about contingencies that is superior to that of the employee, but this is not a central 
point and at any rate not the fundamental reason why the employment contract, and hence the firm, 
emerges. The absence of considerations of knowledge is also indicated by the fact that in both 
treatments the employer grants no discretion with respect to the choice of actions to the employee; 
such delegation would be warranted (ceteris paribus) if the employee possesses superior 
knowledge about contingencies, actions or the matching of contingencies and actions. In other 
words, characteristics of human capital are not included in Coase and Simon’s theories of the 
employment relation, where employees are implicitly taken to be homogenous. 
Williamson on Human Capital and the Employment Relation 
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While Williamson accepts Coase’s emphasis on authority as a defining characteristic of 
the firm, he goes very significantly beyond the Coase-Simon analysis. He does so by taking 
explicit account of human capital, by examining the transaction cost ramifications of human 
capital specificity, and by emphasizing the distinct informational advantages of the hierarchy in 
dealing with specific human capital. While Coase had stressed the savings of transaction costs 
attendant upon changing a spot labor transaction to an employment contract, Williamson locates 
the relevant transaction costs in the opportunism problem that may arise under small-numbers 
bargaining.  
Williamson’s first reflections on these issues from a distinct TCE perspective appear in his 
1975 paper with Wachter and Harris (Williamson, Wachter and Harris, 1975; reprinted with 
modifications as chapter 4 in Williamson, 1975). Williamson begins by declaring that he  
… is concerned with the implications of an extreme form of nonhomogeneity – 
namely, job idiosyncracy – for understanding the employment relation …The purpose 
is to better assess the employment relation in circumstances where workers acquire, 
during the course of their employment, significant job-specific skills and related task-
specific knowledge” (1975: 57; emph. in original).   
In a footnote, he observes that “the employment relation is not an isolated case of idiosyncratic 
exchange conditions. The vertical integration problem turns in no small degree on these same 
considerations” (p.57n). In other words, in 1975 Williamson’s reasoning on the employment 
contract proceeds by extension of the theoretical mechanism that he had developed in his 1971 
and 1973 papers on vertical integration (Williamson, 1971, 1973). 
Explicitly drawing on Becker’s work on human capital, as well as on labor law and the 
internal labor market literature (Doeringer and Piore, 1971), Williamson proceeds by identifying 
four different modes for contracting labor services in a comparative manner, namely by 1) 
sequential spot contracts (contract now for specific performance); 2) contingent claims contracts 
(i.e., contracting now for the specific performance of xi in the future depending contingent on ei 
obtaining);  3) long-term contracting (wait until the future unfolds and contract for the 
appropriate specific action); and 4) the authority relation (as in Coase [1937] and Simon 
[1951]). This identification of the relevant contractual alternatives allows Williamson to take 
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issue with Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and with with Simon (1951). The former famously 
argued that talk of “authority” is a “deceptive way of noting that the employer continually is 
involved in renegotiation of contracts on terms that must be acceptable to both parties” (Alchian 
and Demsetz, 1972), an argment, Williamson (1975: 67) observes, that seems to involve zero or 
negligible transition costs associated with employee turnover, and which therefore corresponds 
to contracting alternative 3) above (rather than to the authority relation). Simon (1951) is 
criticized for only confronting alternatives 1) and 4) which means that “the terms are rigged 
from the outset” (Williamson, 1975: 71): As contractual alternative 1) lacks adaptability, 
transactions requiring such adaptability will naturally lead to the choice of the employment 
contract in Simon’s model. However, there are numerous contractual alternatives that do allow 
for adaptability, so adaptability cannot be the (main) explanation for the choice of the authority 
relation. That choice rather depends on “task idiosyncracies.”  
Drawing on Doering and Piore (1971), Williamson outlines various sources of such 
idiosyncracies, which are to be understood as different manifestations of human capital 
specificity. Thus, such specificity may arise through workers acquiring knowledge about non-
standard equipment (Penrose, 1959), specialized processes (Nelson and Winter, 1982), the 
capabilities of other employees (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972), and firm-specific communication 
channels and values (Arrow, 1974). The problem with task idiosyncracy/specific human capital 
is that “workers are strategically situated to bargain opportunistically” (Williamson, 1975: 74). 
Such opportunistic bargain may cause alternative 4) to be the preferred mode of organizing the 
supply of labor services. The employment relation, Williamson (1975) argues, means making 
use of a collective bargaining system where “wages rates are attached mainly to jobs rather than 
to workers. Not only is individual wage bargaining thereby discouraged, but may even be 
legally foreclosed … The incentives to behave opportunistically … are correspondingly 
attenuated” (idem.).  
A later discussion (Williamson, 1985) expands on labor organization and makes more out 
of opportunism and asset specificity, compared to the treatment in the 1975 book. This reflects 
the increasing “hardening” of Williamson’s research program around the problem of hold-up in 
the presence of specific assets as the apparently universal mechanism that explains choices 
 8
between markets, hybrids and hierarchies. Thus, Williamson explains that what is at issue in 
explaining the organization of work is not the deepening of human capital, but its specificity; 
while both have implications for productivity, only the latter have direct implications for 
organization.  
However, to nuance his analysis, Williamson adds one more dimension, namely that of 
“separability” of “work relations.” The latter is an attempt to capture the issues of inputs and 
output measurability highlighted in agency theory (Williamson specifically refers to Alchian 
and Demsetz, 1972). Accordingly, the separability of work relations depends on how costly it is 
to measure individual outputs. Armed with the dimensions of specificity and separability, 
Williamson constructs a 2x2 matrix that maps the organization of human capital services (1985: 
247). Non-specific, separable human assets, such as migrant farm workers, certain kinds of 
engineers, IT specialists, etc., can move between employers without loss of productivity; there is 
therefore no efficiency interest in maintaining a specific relation.  The “primitive team” obtains 
when human assets are non-specific but their outputs are difficult to measure on an individual 
basis. As analyzed by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) this kind of work organization motivates 
monitoring of inputs. The “obligational market,” in turn obtains when human assets are specific 
but separable. Under these conditions both firms and employees have an interest in maintaining 
the relation, and various devices, such as severance pay and employee benefits such as 
nonvested retirement, arise to discourage arbitrary dismissal or unwanted quits. Under the final 
conditions, high specificity and non-separability, the “relational” team organization arises, 
characterized by strong implicit contracts that can sustain cooperation. Williamson refers to 
Ouchi’s (1980) notion of  “clan organization” and to the Japanese corporation (anno 1985) to 
exemplify the relational team.  
Forbearance and the Informational Advantages of Hierarchy 
In his later work Williamson has placed much less emphasis on collective bargaining than 
he did in his 1975 book, and instead emphasized the informational advantages of the authority 
relation and the hierarchical organization that it is embedded in. However, the theme of the 
informational advantages of hierarchy has been present in Williamson’s work at least since his 
1971 paper. As he argues there, the hierarchy possesses certain inherent advantages over market 
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contracting: “... when conflicts develop, the firm possesses a comparatively efficient resolution 
machinery. To illustrate, fiat is frequently a more efficient way to settle minor conflicts (say 
differences of interpretation) than is haggling or litigation (Williamson, 1971: 114).”  This 
advantage has come to play an increasing role in Williamson’s work. Thus, he has placed 
increasing emphasis on the argument organizational governance is characterized by its own 
implicit contract law, what he calls “forbearance”. To illustrate, whereas divisions will not 
normally be granted standing for a court, corporate headquarters and headquarters function as 
the firm’s “ultimate court of appeal”.  For example, Williamson (1991) points out that disputes 
which arise within the firm, for example, between different divisions, may be easier to resolve 
than disputes arising between firms which sometimes require the use of the court-system. Thus, 
managerial authority partakes of an important role as arbitrator in the face of conflicts and 
disputes over unforeseen contingencies; in other words, Williamson’s extension of the Coasian 
view of authority is to analyze it as a “private ordering,” a private legal institution (Williamson, 
2002). Part of that argument is Williamson’s assertion that there are qualitative and quantitative 
differences between the information structures that are available under market contracting and 
those that are available in the firm, an argument put to work in Williamson’s work on the M-
form as an internal capital market (Williamson, 1975).2  
Employee and Employer Opportunism 
 According to Coase (1937), the key reason why firms exist lies in the exercise of managerial 
authority in response to changes in the environment being an efficient mode of organization for 
certain transactions.  In this view, echoed in countless other contributions to organization theory and 
the theory of the firm, managerial intervention is implicitly always seen as beneficial.3 However, in 
 
2 These are claims that have disputed by what is often referred to as the property rights theorists of the firm. In the 
words of Grossman and Hart (1986: 691):  “... the transaction cost-based argument for integration does not explain 
how the scope for such behaviour changes when one of the self-interested owners becomes an equally self-
interested employee of the other owner.” 
3 However, as Williamson (1996: 150) points out this raises the “puzzle” of the “impossibility of selective 
intervention,” namely, “[w]hy can’t a large firm do everything that a collection of small firms can and more?”  
Thus, a large firm could replicate the market and only selectively intervene when there would be expected net gains 
from this, so that “… the firm will do at least as well as, and will sometimes do better than, the market.”  
Consequently, firms can grow without limits. As this is absurd, the answer to the question of what are the efficient 
boundaries of the firm must involve an understanding of why selective intervention of this kind is impossible, that 
is, a theory of managerial and hierarchical failure. 
 10
actuality, managerial intervention will typically override existing instructions of employees. 
Moreover, in firms where employees are given considerable discretion, managerial intervention 
may amount to overruling decisions that employees have made on the basis of decision rights that 
have been delegated to them (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 1999). This suggests that employee 
utility may be harmed by managerial intervention, particularly when employees perceive 
opportunistic intentions behind such intervention (Foss, 2003). Negative firm-level effects may 
result when employees put in less effort and/or undertake less investment in specific human capital. 
 Contrary to the common claim that Williamson puts all the explanatory emphasis on 
employee opportunism (e.g., Dow, 1987), he has in fact never been blind to the possibility of 
employer opportunism. Thus, Williamson (1996: 150-151) points out that the option to 
intervene “… can be exercised both for good cause (to support expected net gains) and for bad 
(to support the subgoals of the intervenor).”  This raises a series of fundamental incentive 
problems that are rooted in the fact that it may be difficult to verify the nature of the cause and 
that promises to only intervene for good cause are hard to make credible as they are not 
enforceable in a court of law. A problem of “… credibly [promising] to respect autonomy save 
for those cases where expected net gains to intervention can be projected” (Williamson 1993: 
104) remains. An important problem therefore concerns how managerial intervention for good 
cause (i.e., value-increasing intervention) may be promoted, while intervention for bad cause 
(i.e., value-destroying intervention) is avoided. The practical relevance of this issue is 
underscored by a series of empirical studies that suggest that management breaking the 
psychological contract with employees is a phenomenon of frequent occurrence (Rousseau and 
Parks, 1992; Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler, 2000). While Williamson himself has not dealt with 
the issue in any detail, subsequent work has pointed to various mechanisms, such as implicit 
contracts (Kreps 1990; Baker et al. 1999), explicit credible commitments, or organizational 
structure (Aghion and Tirole 1997; Foss, Foss, and Vazquez, 2006) that may reduce the 
incidence and severity of harmful managerial interventions. 
Empirical Application  
There is a now a huge body of empirical literature examining various issues in transaction 
cost economics. Many empirical studies have examined the make-or-buy decision, focusing 
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mainly on the transaction cost approach.4 The empirical TCE literature is surveyed and 
summarized in Shelanski and Klein (1995) and Macher and Richman (2006), and the bulk of the 
evidence is interpreted as consistent with the predictions of TCE (see David and Han [2003] for 
a contrary view).  Despite challenges associated with the measurement and definition of key 
variables, the role of asset specificity, comparison with rival theories, and causality, the 
transaction cost model seems to have straightforward empirical implications, such that observed 
forms of organizational governance can be explained in terms of asset specificity, uncertainty, 
frequency, and so on.  
Indeed, much of the success of Williamson’s formulation of TCE lies exactly in his 
identification of the key attributes that determine governance costs (Masten, 1996: 45).  In 
Coase (1937), the decision rule/prediction is that GS* = GS1, if GC1 < GC2 and GS* = GS2, if 
GC1 ( GC2 (“GS” is governance structure, “GC” is governance cost).  From the empirical point 
of view, Williamson’s contribution is to specify the cost relations ( GC1 = (1X+ e1 and GC2   = (2 
X+e2, X being the vector of observable attributes that impact governance costs ( , yielding 
testable reduced form relations by means of qualitative choice models (e.g., probit models).   
Early empirical work in TCE all took such an approach (Monteverde and Teece, 1982; 
Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984; Masten, 1984; John and Weitz, 1988). Monteverde and Teece 
draw on Teece’s (1980) earlier work on how firm-specific human capital may help shaping the 
horizontal boundaries of the firm (i.e., diversification) to examine how firm-specific “industrial 
know-how,” represented by the applications engineering effort (rated on a 1-10 scale) associated 
with the development of a given automobile component, shapes the incentives to engage in 
vertical integration. Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) examine whether the function of personal 
selling (as opposed to mass communication) is integrated or not, in the sense of whether a 
manufacturer’s representative is used or rather an employed salesperson.  The human capital 
specificity of the sales person is measured through variables that measure, for example, the 
difficulty of the salesperson learning the ins and outs of a company, including learning about 
accounts, the importance of customer loyalty, etc. John and Weitz (1988) measured the 
 
4 Comparatively little empirical work looks at agency theory (excepting corporate finance and governance 
applications), the resource-based view, and the property-rights approach.   
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specificity of human capital investments by the time required for newly hired salesperson with 
industry-experience to familiarize himself with a given firm’s products and customer-base.  
Since these classic studies, numerous studies in industrial organization and regulation (e.g., 
Crocker and Masten, 1996; Saussier, 2000), alliance organization (Dyer, 1997), international 
business ( and marketing (e.g., Anderson, 1985; Heide and John, 1988) have examined the 
impact of human capital specificity on governance and contractual choice. Most confirm the 
TCE prediction(s). However, in a provocative paper Masten, Sheehan and Snyder (1991) 
suggest that standard TCE may have misconstrued the reason for this consistent finding. The 
standard story (Williamson, 1975, 1985) has specific human capital being associated with 
employment contracts because the costs of organizing the sourcing of the relevant services 
through market contracting is are too high. However, it may be, Masten et al. argue, that it is 
simply less costly to manage workers with more specific skills; thus, firm organization is 
preferred for specific human capital, not because the costs of using the market for organizing 
such assets are too high, but because internal costs of organization are low. This clearly smacks 
of the knowledge-based approach to the firm (particularly Kogut and Zander, 1992) rather than 
of TCE.   
However, as Poppo and Zenger (1999) point out the standard empirical research designs 
do not discriminate between TCE and competiting approaches such as the measurement 
approach (Barzel, 1997) or knowledge-based approaches (e.g., Arrow, 1974; Demsetz, 1991; 
Kogut and Zander, 1992). All three approaches will, roughly, predict that specific human capital 
and firm organization are highly correlated. Poppo and Zenger develop and test a model of 
comparative institutional performance rather than institutional choice, and thereby examine the 
degree of support for the three competing explanations of boundary choice. For their sample of 
firms, they disconfirm the Masten et al. hypothesis.5 However, they also conclude that the 
evidence points to the need to eclectically combine the three theories for a satisfactory 
understanding of the boundaries of the firm, at least in the context of the sourcing of IT-services. 
 
 
5 Comparatively little empirical work looks at agency theory (excepting corporate finance and governance 
applications), the resource-based view, and the property-rights approach.   
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PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACHES AND HUMAN CAPITAL 
Property Rights and Incomplete Contracts 
 The property rights approach was initiated in Grossman and Hart (1986) and explicitly 
motivated as an attempt to model Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) and Williamson’s ideas 
on asset specificity, using game theoretical modeling conventions (see Hart [1995] for an 
accessible introduction).6 However, the outcome of that attempt was essentially a new theory.7 
The basic logic of the approach is as follows. As in Williamson’s work, a central assumption is 
that real-world contracts must necessarily be incomplete in the sense that the allocation of 
control rights cannot specified for all future states of the world (Grossman and Hart, 1986). 
Ownership is defined as the possession of residual rights of control, that is, rights to control the 
uses of assets under contingencies that are not specified in the contract. Residual rights over 
human capital cannot be transferred. Control implies the ability to exclude other agents from 
deciding on the use of certain assets, for example, the owner has the right to pull out the assets 
he owns from a relation. Such ownership rights can confer bargaining power, and play an 
important role in the determination of the efficient boundaries of the firm. Thus, control rights 
determine the boundaries of the firm: A firm is defined as a collection of jointly owned assets. 
Obviously, the relevant assets are alienable assets plus, possibly, the owner’s inalienable human 
capital.8  
 Asset ownership is important because the willingness of an agent to undertake a non-
contractible investment (notably an investment in human capital) which is specific to the non-
alienable asset(s) in the relation depends on who owns the asset(s).  If the agent who undertakes 
 
6 Indeed, Williamson (1996: 372-73) argued that TCE had progressed from “pre-formal” (i.e., Coase’s work) to 
“semi-formal” (i.e., Williamson’s own work) and “fully formal” (i.e., the new property rights view) stages. 
However, in a later discussion Williamson (2000) finds the new property rights finds it substantially different from 
his own framework in several key respects. 
7 Klein, Crawford and Alchian as well as Williamson have unforeseen contingencies at the heart of their stories: It 
is the haggling that arises when contracts are pushed outside of their self-enforcing range by unforeseen 
contingencies that is the main problem. What matters is the ex post action. In contrast, most of the incomplete 
contracting approach assumes that ex post bargaining is efficient and that actions (e.g., with respect to investment) 
are taken immediately after the contract is signed. Thus, what drives these models are misaligned ex ante 
incentives, particularly with respect to investment in vertical buyer-supplier relationships. 
8 The basic distinction between an independent contractor and an employee, that is to say, between an inter-firm 
and an intra-firm transaction, turns on who owns the physical assets which the agent utilizes in his work. An 
independent contractor owns his tools etc., while an employee does not. 
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the investment does not own the asset, she may, as in Williamson’s work, be subject to a hold-
up by the owner. On the other hand, the ability to deprive an agent of the piece of capital with 
which she works (and to which she may be heavily specialized) provides room for authority. 
Efficiency then dictates that the agent who is to make the most important (non-contractible) 
asset-specific investment should own the asset. It is not that opportunism can be avoided by 
internal organization/integration per se. Integration may shift incentives for opportunistic 
behavior, but it does not remove such incentives. Given this, one should choose the ownership 
arrangement that via its impact on incentives minimizes the consequences of opportunism. In 
sum, the property rights approach is a theory of the efficient allocation of ownership to alienable 
assets, given investments, ( typically in human capital ( that may be important to value creation, 
but are non-contractible.  
Extensions: Access, Implicit Contracts, and Organization Ownership 
 Employees are not, strictly speaking, part of the firm because employees cannot be owned.  
However as Rajan and Zingales (1998: 388) point out, “... there is a sense in which employees 
‘belong’ to an organization ... This sense of belonging arises from the expectation ‘good 
citizens’ of an organization have that they will receive a share of future organizational rents”. 
This sort of belonging can be explained within the confines of the property rights approach by 
invoking the concept of “access.” This means that agents are allowed to work with critical 
resources, specialize themselves relative to these resources, and make themselves valuable in 
this way. Since a specialized employee can control her own specialized human capital, she now 
has additional power, although she doesn’t possess more residual rights of control. As Rajan and 
Zingales show, access may sometimes provide better incentives for making efficient effort 
choices or investments in human capital than direct ownership.  
 Incentives may also be provided by even softer means.  When it is difficult to write 
complete state-contingent contracts, for example, when certain variables are either ex ante 
unspecifiable or ex post unverifiable, people often rely on “unwritten codes of conduct”, that is, 
on implicit contracts. These may be self-enforcing, in the sense that each party lives up to the 
other party’s (reasonable) expectations from a fear of retaliation and breakdown of cooperation.  
In an early extension of the property rights approach, Kreps (1990) argues that employers and 
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employees may be seen as playing a prisoners dilemma-game, that with repeated plays a 
cooperative norm (interpreted as corporate culture), may be established, and that this established 
norm tells employees (as well as outside contractors) that firm management will not 
opportunistically take advantage of them. The firm is seen in Kreps’ paper, not as a collection of 
physical assets as in Grossman and Hart (1986), but rather as a carrier of reputation capital. 
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002) also merge ideas on self-enforcing contracts with property 
rights, showing how the allocation of ownership influences which relational contracts are 
feasible. Klein (1988) takes a different approach. He argues that rather than focusing on 
individual human or physical assets in the analysis of the boundaries of the firm, attention 
should be directed to what “organization ownership”. Thus, Klein argues that vertical 
integration may imply a certain degree of ownership of human capital after all. For an 
organization can obtain ownership of another organization’s organization capital, that is, the 
firm-specific knowledge embodied in the organization’s team of employees (i.e., its 
capabilities). This can alleviate the hold-up problem, for the reason that it is (post integration) 
hard for the now integrated team to hold up the acquiring organization. The costs of collective 
action may be prohibitive and/or the hold-up attempt may be illegal according to labor law.  
 
TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS AND  
OTHER PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN CAPITAL 
Since its takeoff in the mid-1970s, TCE has continuously been subject to strong criticism, in the 
beginning mainly from Marxists (Marglin, 1974) and sociologists (Perrow, 1986), but 
increasingly from management scholars (e.g., Kogut and Zander, 1992; Ghoshal, 1994; Ghoshal 
and Moran, 1996). The treatment in the theory of the employment relation and human capital 
has been criticized in particular. It is characteristic of TCE that human capital is treated like any 
other asset, and not even its inalienability is emphasized. (In contrast, the inalienable character 
of human capital is a key point in the property rights approach). While theoretical generality is 
to be strived for, there is, of course, the fundamental distinction between human capital and 
other assets that only human capital is touched by intention, rationality, motivation, and so on. 
Implicitly, this recognition lies underneath many of the critiques of TCE.  
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TCE and Bounded Rationality 
 As mentioned, bounded rationality is a behavioral starting point for TCE. . “But for 
bounded rationality,” Williamson argues (1996: 36), “all issues of organization collapse in favor 
of comprehensive contracting of either Arrow-Debreu or mechanism design kinds.” More 
generally, Williamson (1998) argues that taking more account of the relevant psychological 
literature will improve the understanding of organization “… as an instrument for utilizing 
varying cognitive and behavioral propensities to best advantage” (Williamson 1998: 12).  
 In spite of his insistence on the necessity of assuming boundedly rational behaviour, 
Williamson is in actuality rather vague on bounded rationality. He notes that “[e]conomizing on 
bounded rationality takes two forms. One concerns decision processes and the other involves 
governance structures.  The use of heuristic problem-solving … is a decision process response” 
(Williamson, 1985: 46). The latter “form” is not central, however, in transaction cost economics, 
which, Williamson argues, “… is principally concerned … with the economizing consequences 
of assigning transactions to governance structures in a discriminating way.”  Thus, Williamson 
is interested in making use of bounded rationality for the purpose of explaining the existence 
and boundaries of firms and therefore the choice between alternative governance structures 
rather than for the purposes of explaining “administrative behavior,” as in Simon (1947).   
 However, it is open to some debate whether it makes much sense to separate bounded 
rationality as an important ingredient in the understanding of governance structures from 
bounded rationality as the starting point for the understanding of decision processes, as different 
governance structures likely exhibit different decision process properties (March and Simon, 
1958). Clearly, from an organizational theory point of view, the lack of concern with decision 
processes means that the important possibility that bounds on rationality may be endogenous to 
organization is not inquired into. Moreover, even from a mainstream TCE position, interest in 
more far-reaching notions of bounded rationality seems warranted. Thus, while TCE seems to 
presuppose that organization is highly flexible and plastic, the existence of, for example, 
endowment effects (Camerer, Heath, and Knez, 1993) among employees may complicate 
organizational change and make such change sluggish (for more speculation on these issues, see 
Foss, 2001).  
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TCE and Employee Motivation  
 While the role of bounded rationality in the theory of the firm has given rise to a fair 
amount of debate (e.g., Furubotn and Richter, 1997; Foss, 2001), it is nothing compared to the 
enormous amount of critical writings on the motivational assumptions in the theory. In 
particular, opportunism has been a favorite bête-noire. Some such criticisms (e.g., that the 
theory assumes all agents to be opportunists) can be dismissed as demonstrably false. However, 
according to a recent critique, which is not so easily dismissd, a primary problem with the 
treatment of motivation in TCE is not opportunism per se, but rather that modern economic 
approaches assume that all motivation is of the “extrinsic” type (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; 
Osterloh and Frey, 2000).  In other words, all behavior is understood in terms of encouragement 
from an external force, such as the expectance of a monetary reward.  (In contrast, when 
“intrinsically” motivated, individuals wish to undertake a task for its own sake). These 
arguments do not necessarily deny the reality of opportunism, moral hazard, and so on, but 
assert that there are other, more appropriate ways to handle these problems than providing 
monetary incentives, sanctions, and monitoring.  The arguments are often based on social 
psychological research (Deci and Ryan, 1985) and on experimental economics (e.g., Fehr and 
Gächter, 2000).   
In one version of the argument, Ghoshal and Moran (1996) argue that the theory of the 
firm misconstrues the causal relation between motivation (e.g., the tendency to shirk) and the 
surrounding environment (the type of governance structure in place). They claim that 
individuals within an organization perform not according to the incentives and opportunities 
offered, but to their “feelings for the entity.”  “Hierarchical” controls, they state, reduce 
organizational loyalty and thus increase shirking. Reliance on internal governance in the 
presence of relationship-specific investments, they hold, causes the very problems it is designed 
to alleviate: Williamson’s approach becomes a “self-fulfilling prophecy,” and is therefore “bad 
for practice.” Osterloh and Frey (2000) ask which organizational forms are conducive to 
knowledge creation and transfer. They note that elements of market control (e.g., high-powered 
incentives) are often introduced in firms to accomplish this. However, Osterloh and Frey argue 
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that this only works to the extent that there is no “motivation crowding-out effect,” in which 
extrinsic motivation does not crowd out intrinsic motivation (Deci and Ryan, 1985).  
While these critiques are subtle and founded on important research from motivational 
psychology, it is somewhat questionable how much bite they really have as a critique of TCE.  
To be sure, intrinsic motivation etc. is not usually raised as an issue by TCE scholars. However, 
it has been a recurrent theme in TCE that the incentives that characterize internal organization 
are ―and, indeed, generally should be ― low-powered (Williamson, 1996). While the 
mechanism that supports this conclusion may be different (namely, multi-tasking agency theory, 
Holmström and Milgrom, 1991), the conclusion is the same as the one obtained by psychology-
based arguments.  
TCE and the Capabilities View 
 A recurring critique of TCE has concerned its neglect of productive capabilities (e.g., 
Kogut and Zander 1992). Differential capabilities give rise to different production costs, and 
that such cost differentials may crucially influence the make or buy decision: firms may 
internalize activities because they can carry out these activities in a more production (not 
transaction) cost-efficient way than other firms are capable of. The factors that make 
capabilities distinctive and costly to imitate, for example, complexity and tacitness, also mean 
that such differences in production costs may be long-lived.  Knowledge-based writers also 
claim that the existence of the firm can be explained in knowledge-based terms and without 
making use of the assumption of opportunism (Hodgson 2004). Kogut and Zander (1992) 
argue that firms exist because they can create certain assets — such as learning capabilities or a 
“shared context”— that markets purportedly cannot create (Kogut and Zander 1992: 384).  The 
problem with this argument is that it does not sufficiently characterize firms: Markets can 
cultivate learning capabilities and shared context (as in industrial districts) as well. If these assets 
are indeed largely internalized in firms, it is, from the TCE point of view, exactly because they are 
firm-specific assets that yield an appropriable quasi-rent. Teece’s (1982) early work on 
diversification, which merged Penrosian arguments (Penrose, 1959) with TCE, made exactly this 
point.  
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 While TCE scholars may take issue with specific knowledge-based explanations the view 
does point to some weak points in the theory of the firm.  For example, differential capabilities 
probably do play a role in determining the boundaries of the firm (Walker and Weber 1984; 
Monteverde 1995; Argyes 1996).  However, there are two major problems in this area that may 
hinder progress. The first is that the nature of the central construct (i.e., capabilities) itself is 
highly unclear. It is not clear how capabilities are conceptualized, dimensionalized, and 
measured, and it is not clear how capabilities emerge and are changed by individual action 
(Abell, Felin and Foss, 2008). The second problem partly follows from the first: the mechanisms 
between capabilities and economic organization are unclear. This points to a need for 
understanding in a detailed manner how specific human capital assets combine inside firms to 
yield firm-level capabilities.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
TCE represents the first systematic attempt to explore the organizational ramifications of human 
capital for economic organization, that is, the choice between alternative contractual and 
governance structures. While they are certainly taken up, with the rationale of the employment 
contract, Coase and Simon take no particular interest in human capital. In contrast, Williamson, 
building on earlier contributions by Gary Becker and labor market economists, argues that the 
services of specific human capital would tend to be organized through employment contracts. 
His treatment of such assets is not fundamentally different from his treatment of other specific 
assets; the “fundamental transformation” etc. may obtain for human capital as well as for any 
other kind of productive asset. However, Williamson clearly recognizes that the law regulating 
labor transactions are different from the law regulating other transactions. The property rights 
approach presents a complementary logic, based on the inalienability of human capital.  
TCE is first and foremost intended by its creator(s) as an economics-based theory of the 
efficient choice of contractual and governance structures. It is not a management theory of, for 
example, human resource management, although the theory obviously does hold implications 
for important strategic management and organization issues, such as vertical integration, 
diversification, etc. However, in actuality, TCE has emerged as one of the important source 
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theories for much theorizing in management. This implies that the critiques that have been 
leveled against the theory over at least the last two decades for an inadequate treatment of, 
particularly, cognition and motivation need to be taken seriously. For example, a more adequate 
treatment of bounded rationality may lead to the identification and conceptualization of other 
sources of transaction costs than opportunism (Foss, 2001), transaction costs that are relevant to 
economic organization.  
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